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1. Introduction 
 
A number of authors have helped to demonstrate the extent to which performance of e-
commerce firms is based on their ability to design, control and manage an enormous amount of 
information on an ongoing basis so as consumers can easily grasp and understand goods and 
services provided. Thanks to the wide range of technologies made available by the Internet 
along with methods for appropriating these technologies, highly diversified economic 
infrastructures and business models, autonomizing specific economic functions, can be 
mobilized for the purpose of marketing a single product or service. 
 
Highlighting and revealing the informational aspect of transactions is useful but not helpful 
enough in explaining current market configurations or the strategies that economic agents 
deploy. Buzzel (1985) shows, for example, how distributors and intermediaries acquired power 
over producers and get more influence as they moved from wholesalers engaged in buying and 
selling products to more complex forms of intermediation and prescription. mobilizing 
information and communications technology1. More specifically, allowing consumers to 
compare products directly without having to rely on supposedly knowledgeable experts, the 
Internet changed the traditional role of the intermediary2 ; it no longer functions as just a 
distributor or expert consultant but also regulates transactions, promoting and prescribing goods 
and services. As a consequence, many authors have attempted to describe and provide 
characterization of the various forms of intermediation (Spulber, 1996 and 1999; Chircu and 
Kaufmann, 1999; Brousseau, 2002). For example, Gensollen (1999) identifies several different 
actors who can play an intermediary role: attractors, aggregators, converters (i.e. those who 
convert an audience into customers) and prescribers3.  
 
Our premise is that the mechanisms at work in distribution and intermediation at stake in the 
business models existing on Internet should be assessed in terms of a prescription economy. By 
analyzing the markets in terms of prescription, i.e. the capacity of a firm to transform the 
potential request of a customer into a specific proposal of products, we can investigate the 
structure of a product or service supply, the decision-making process involved in purchasing, 
market configurations, and business strategies and models. 
 
Analyzing intermediation and information markets in terms of prescription means considering 
three-pronged markets where prescribers are not simple intermediaries but third parties : they 
act alongside producers and consumers – not between them – in order to structure the product 
or service supply or to assume responsibility for some aspect of the consumer decision. If we 
proceed on this assumption, we can identify the market strategies and structures that 
characterize a prescription economy. 
 
Our paper aims at proposing a model for prescription on a three-pronged basis, and at exploring 
the way it can be applied to explain the various strategies and business models used on the 
Internet. In the first part of this chapter, we shall present our model for prescription and the 
strategic variables actionable by prescribers. In the second part, these results will help us to 
characterize the various existing forms of prescription and to propose a typology of prescribers. 
                                                 
1 This analysis of the impact of distribution and other downstream activities in the manufacturing sector complements work in the field of information systems, notably 
by Steve Barley (1986). 
2 An idea that has received renewed attention owing to the growth of the Internet and other activities that reflect the expanding role of the knowledge economy (cf. 
Peter Kollock, 1999; Eric Brousseau, 2002) 
3 For Gensollen, prescribers do not truly exist but constitute the ultimate form of intermediation: the delivery of information from uniform groups of consumers to 
producers so that new products and services can be tailored to the tastes that these consumers have come to share over time. 
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The forms of prescription provide a key to understand the economic structuring of the Internet. 
There, prescription assumes a wider range of forms (in terms of how users select content and in 
the nature of the relationship with consumers and sellers) insofar as the Internet is more 
complex: it offers a wider range of information products and greater variety with regard to 
value chains, economic players and business models. 
 
 
2. The economic foundations of the prescription 
 
In order to delineate the phenomenon at stake and to establish the economic foundations of 
prescription, we shall firstly describe more precisely what can be considered as prescription. 
Discussing various examples will help us to discard the one-dimensional view of the market in 
which supply matches appropriately to demand, possibly via an intermediary or market 
platform4. Each component of prescription function (collection of information, selection of 
goods and services, support to the decision-making process of the consumer, assistance in the 
transactional process) influence the market configuration, the control of customer relation and 
emerging business models. It encourages us to replace it with a three-pronged model involving 
the supplier, the consumer and the prescriber. Using this model will help us to make out the 
various revenue sources for prescribers and the strategic levers at their disposal for gaining 
competitive advantage. 
 
2.1.  A widespread  situation 
The phenomenon of prescription is very diffused and can be found in several industries and 
professions, from doctors (who prescribe medications) to educators (who prescribe specific 
classroom textbooks), architects, contractors, financial advisers and asset managers. In each of 
these situations, responsibility for the purchasing decision is transferred; moreover, there is no 
longer a link between the market that brings the product or service provider and the prescriber 
together and the market that brings the prescriber and the consumer together – these two 
markets each generate their own transactions and dynamics. For example, educators are in a 
position to recommend the textbooks that will be used in their courses: their role is not simply 
to inform or to influence but to actually issue an injunction. The same is true of physicians and 
the medications they prescribe to their patients. All theses cases are putting on view  different 
markets structure where intermediaries are no more a mere chain link in the supply chain but  
contribute to more complex economic configurations.. 
 
Hatchuel (1995) has demonstrated how consumers disqualify themselves as decision-makers by 
relying on an outside prescriber, who defines how buyers perceive the goods to be searched, 
establishes the value assigned to these goods and points buyers toward one particular supplier 
over another. Hatchuel emphasizes how, in this case, knowledge is transferred to the end 
consumer, but he does not consider this a structural component of the market: when viewed as 
primarily a cognitive function, prescription is necessarily temporary in nature because 
consumers gradually acquire the knowledge that they previously lacked and, as a result, they 
have less and less need to rely on an expert. In this case, the relationship between seller and 
prescriber is limited to the domain of information and decision-making (i.e. the seller’s attempt 
to influence the prescriber5) in a form of extra-market competition. In essence, this approach is 
very similar to the one advocated by authors who have studied electronic intermediation, which 
is characterized by the ability to take advantage of the correspondence between transactional 
                                                 
4 See, in particular, developments made on two-sided markets by Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, 2003. 
5 Extensive marketing research has been conducted on this topic. 
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flows and information resources. Our model aims precisely at  modelling how such different 
flows and transactions articulate with one another. 
 
2.2. A three-pronged model 
We assume, in this paper, that in the economics of prescription, there is no longer one sole 
market, operating between producers and consumers. Our main argument is that three markets 
work together wherein decisions are transferred, the decision-making process is compounded, 
and the market is filtered by prescribers. These markets can be defined as follows, recaping the 
primary characteristics of our model: 
 
 
1. A web of transactions among three groups: 
 
o Suppliers (S), providing goods and services. 
o Consumers (D), representing end demand. 
o Prescribers, who offer or recommend goods and services. 
 
 
2. A network of exchanges occurring in three separate markets: 
 
o The primary market of relevant goods and services,  where consumers make a 
selection from a range of goods provided. 
o The prescriber market, which governs relations between consumers and the various 
prescribers. 
o The referral market, which regulates the acquisition of goods and the selection of 
information between prescribers and sellers. 
 
Figure 1. The prescription markets: a three-pronged structure 
 
  
The examples in Table 1 show how this three-pronged structure provides a simple means of 
grasping the various configurations found in prescription-based markets6. 
 
Insert Table 1 :  Some configuration of prescription markets 
 
 
                                                 
6 For purposes of clarity, we have initially restricted ourselves to examples taken from outside the Internet. 
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2.3. The variables of prescription 
Our model helps out to establish prescribers as full-part economic actors in different markets. 
We propose, then, to identify the range of variables at their disposal to set their strategy and 
economic business models. They can be sorted in two main categories : first, the sources of 
revenues which support prescribers’ activity, then, their competitive leverages. 
 
2.3.1. Sources of revenue for prescribers 
 
Differentiating transactions, we can better understand how companies get revenue on each 
market and the opposing strategies they use. If the participants conduct a simple purchase or 
sale, their remuneration comes primarily from the profit yielded by the transaction. By contrast, 
if they facilitate the exchange or provide advice, their remuneration may be based on the 
commission that the seller or buyer is willing to pay in return (Hackett, 1992). As shown in 
Figure 1, prescribers participate in two different markets: the referral market and the 
prescription market. They can create value on both markets, performing information processing 
and certification on the first one, whereas operating matching between consumer’s request and 
product selection on the second one. The range of potential revenue sources and business 
models depends specifically on the prescriber’s ability to become operative on these two 
markets. 
 
In the prescription market, prescribers create value by explicitly selling the act of prescription to 
consumers 
Consumers can gain access to prescription via payment for a service (in the case of occasional 
access) or through a subscription that provides comprehensive access to the prescriber’s 
services. The latter case relates quite directly to the business models used by publishers and 
content programmers. Its effectiveness is determined by the prescriber’s ability to offer a 
quality product or service that is reliable, identifiable and discriminating (providing access to a 
complete and exclusive supply or to a specific type of goods). In addition, prescribers can 
create value from their expertise in related markets: for example, their ability to attract a large 
number of consumers will give them access to the advertising market. 
 
In the referral market, prescribers create value by ensuring that sellers provide payment for 
referrals 
This form of marketing assumes that the prescriber is developing strategies for ensuring its 
selectivity rather than simply accumulating and enlarging the information base it provides. This 
is what major retail networks and shop bots have done on the Internet. Search engines are 
developing in the same way: after initially providing a basic service of locating and ordering 
existing pages on the Web, they are now becoming value-added directories that offer site 
selectivity, preferential listings and so on in return for payment from the sites that they list.  
This remuneration may be a one-time payment for a referral listing or it may be indexed to the 
number of contacts that the prescriber generated. 
 
The effectiveness and justification for paying prescribers in return for selectivity will depend on 
the prescriber’s ability to attract a large number of consumers or to reach a specific market 
segment or niche (through differentiation). To do this, prescribers must be able to guarantee 
consumers that their supply is of good quality and relatively complete or that it matches their 
specific interests (in the case of portals for virtual communities for instance). 
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Prescribers try to empower the primary market for goods whereas they are not initially directly 
involved 
The transaction that takes place on the primary market between the seller and the consumer 
does not necessarily entail prescriber. For example, shop bots engines, classified advertising 
sites and auction sites bring together buyers and sellers who then negotiate directly. However, 
prescribers may receive compensations in the form of a commission on any transactions that 
take place, and get some profit on the referral market, in relation with primary market. Any 
form of prescription may involve such remuneration, but the Internet particularly encourages 
this economic model since it can be used to track a consumer’s browsing behaviour and to 
identify any transactions that were generated with the help of a given prescriber. 
 
Summary 
As summarized in Table 2, the prescriber’s competitive position and the range of eligible 
business models depend specifically on its ability to bring these various sources of revenue into 
play. Prescription can include other functions as well (distribution, technical intermediation 
etc.) to combine and enhance the various sources of revenue associated with these markets. 
 
Table 2 : Sources of revenue for prescribers 
 
Market Revenue source 
Sale of referral listings 
Profit-sharing 
Marketing of customer data7 Referral market 
Sale of advertising space 
Sale of information and evaluations Prescriber market Distribution margin 
Primary market Commission on transactions 
 
 
 
Example : Classified advertising sites 
Classified ad sites are not part of the primary market per se (i.e. the market for goods); instead, 
they offer a selection of available goods, providing referral opportunities and in some cases 
certification (e-Bay, for example, provides information on the reliability of vendors and 
buyers), assessing their quality (as does Amazon.com, which collects critiques submitted by 
web users) and providing related services (as with used car sites, which offer a warranty, after-
sales service, insurance and support).  
 
Competition among these classified ad sites stems largely from their ability to define their 
service and position themselves differently in each of the three submarkets in our model. 
 
a. Some adhere to the principles that govern business models for classified advertising in 
newspapers. They ensure payment for the advertiser and offer a browser function for buyers 
free of charge. Under these circumstances, advertisers will give preference to the sites that 
attract the largest audience. 
b. Therefore, in order to establish an advertising base, competitors can choose to reverse the 
usual roles in the referral market and compensate advertisers, perhaps in return for an 
exclusivity agreement to ensure that the same ads will not also appear on competing sites8. 
                                                 
7 We are including these revenue sources in the listings market, but they belong more specifically to derivative markets. 
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c. Finally, some sites offer their prescription services at no charge and generate revenue solely 
by assessing a fee on the primary market (as with eBay and estate-agent sites) or on related 
markets. Yet, prescribers can create classified ad sites in order to capture consumers at a 
sufficiently early stage so as to offer them a wide selection of products, ranging from financial 
services (loans, insurance, warranties and after-sales services) to related products that might be 
of interest (e.g. consumables for customers purchasing capital goods, similar products for those 
who buy cultural items and so on). 
 
 
2.3.2. Competitive leverage 
When the forms of economic organization are based on three-pronged structures involving 
sellers, prescribers and potential buyers, the decision-making process for consumers becomes 
more complex than economic theory suggests. Demand is no longer based solely on individual 
preference and pulled by supply structuring (price and product information, competition etc.); it 
is also determined by prescription methods and strategies, the relationship with the prescribers 
and the price differentiation arising from the prescriber’s cost structure. This complexity with 
regard to adjustment variables in supply and demand is reflected in both the decision-making 
process for consumers and the competitive mechanisms in the prescriber market. 
 
The prescription supply is defined by a number of strategic variables that prescribers use to 
position themselves.: 
 
- The range of services that prescriber develops and provides. 
- The cost of subscription services, access to the service supply, consulting services 
etc. 
- The production function of prescription (the cost of acquiring informations and 
producing the services provided to customers, the management costs of transactions 
and access, overhead costs and so on). 
 
At the same time, consumer demand for prescription can be defined on the basis of: 
 
- The quality, quantity and variety of the prescriber’s supply. 
- The cost of acquiring information on the products or services. 
- The costs supported by the consumer (subscription, entrance fees etc.). 
 
To sum up, competition among prescribers is driven by two primary set of factors and exists 
over two time dimensions. Prescribers compete on price (rates, payment terms) and on supply 
(the size and scope of the service line, quality, customization level and exclusivity). Moreover, 
prescribers compete over time : to increase the instantaneous audience at each moment, to 
capture consumers through long terme subscriptions. 
 
In some other cases, the prescriber is also a distributor and prescription takes place through the 
selection of products provided to consumers. As a consequence, competition may concern 
products offered on the primary market  as well as the informations provided about the products 
offered on the primary market. With banking and financial sites, for example, prescription 
involve selling selected financial products on one hand and providing financial information or 
consulting services on the other. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
8 When the US real estate market emerged on the internet, RealSelect joined forces with one of the largest franchise networks in order to gain a solid point of access 
to the market. The site offered to provide equity capital for the network and to publish its advertising at no charge in exchange for access to information databases. 
Microsoft HomeAdvisor, meanwhile, entered the market by initially paying its advertisers one dollar.  
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Price competition 
Whether they are just providing informations or distributing selecting goods, the same various 
strategies are available to prescribers for differentiating their price structure and positioning 
below their competitors’ prices : 
 
- Reduce the cost and quality of their supply : while acting as intermediairies, it is less 
expensive for prescribers to acquire the products and services to be provided if they can limit 
the number offered (to reduce transaction costs) or develop an alternative supply of lower 
quality. This strategy is the only option available when overhead costs for customer 
management and acquisition and production costs are the same for all prescribers. 
- Establish an internal cost structure that is more favourable than that of competitors: in 
order to improve productivity, prescribers will seek to implement economies of scale in 
distribution (promotional activities designed to increase the number of customers and reduce 
the administrative cost per customer, bundling and grouped sales, etc.) or create ancillary or by-
product markets where they can apportion overhead costs and generate new resources on the 
referral market (providing  services or customer data) or the prescriber market (through the sale 
of such by-products.). 
- Offset costs between markets setting the direction of the referral market: as described 
earlier, remuneration can be paid 1) by the supplier of goods to the prescriber (when sellers pay 
for preferential treatment for their products or, in the case of selective distribution, to ensure 
exclusivity) or 2) by the prescriber to the supplier (when prescribers are paying for exclusive 
information or access to the sellers’ goods for the purpose of exclusive distribution). Prescribers 
that bring the direction of the market into play can offer a more attractive price structure by 
basing their economic model and remuneration on the referral market rather than on the 
prescriber market. In this way, they can wholly reverse and change the nature of their 
relationship with both customers and competitors. 
 
Last outcome is one of the essential contributions of our three-pronged model; it does not 
merely reflect the existence of two different markets but demonstrates that the direction of the 
relationship between sellers and prescribers is a true strategic variable. 
 
Competition over supply of the services and products provided 
Prescription can be the exclusive presentation of information aggregates, or it may be the result 
of a more complex selection process and expertise (as with guides to fine dining or search-
engine portals, for example). In each case, the care with which the supply is structured is a 
critical competitive factor. There are a number of ways in which prescribers can enhance the 
appeal of their supply over that of their competitors: 
 
- Provide exclusive services: this strategy has a direct impact on relations with goods and 
services providers9 in terms of the acquisition of rights, exclusivity, and production cost. The 
wider adoption of exclusive distribution rights has a noteworthy effect : it substantially 
increases the purchase price, since rare or appealing goods  are the subject of intense bidding10. 
At the same time, the potential increase in the number of customers as a result of exclusive 
distribution rights can also lead to increased administrative costs. 
- Develop a specialized supply based on expertise: specializing expertise (either in terms of 
its quality or its area of content) helps to target specific customer segments identified on the 
basis of marketing data and then to aggregate these segments. This strategy requires a policy of 
encouraging trade and consumption within virtual communities11 as well as such actions to 
                                                 
9 Producers of original audiovisual works or those that hold the rights to such works (including sports federations and film producers, in particular). 
10 On the other hand, goods with smaller market potential can be acquired, in some cases, for less than their manufacturing cost. 
11 See the section by Gensollen in this work. 
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encourage customer loyalty as giveaways and discounts for major customers. However, it 
creates a significant risk that consumers may depart en masse for a more attractive prescriber. 
- Significantly expand the volume of the supply : this strategy encourages customer loyalty, 
generates economies of scale and makes it difficult for new competitors to enter the market. It 
is attractive to buyers insofar as it reduces the price of comprehensive services and cuts 
transaction costs.  
 
Competition based on acquiring customers 
The third way that prescribers can improve their competitive position is by capturing 
consumers. This strategy makes use of the transfer of decision-making and the ability to make 
decisions at any time by prompting customers to make ex ante commitment to a prescriber 
before making a selection on the primary market. 
 
In concrete terms, prescribers can increase their ability to capture consumers with the help of 
several economic and sales tools: by creating long-term subscriptions, providing a 
technological platform (terminals, software)12, preventing defections (through its rules and 
regulations or as a result of the learning curve that consumers must master) and establishing 
repeat-transaction incentives (such as customer loyalty and price discount programmes). 
 
Consumers realize that this is in their best interests, since it leads to a reduction in both the 
fixed costs they must bear and the cost of acquiring information (as consumers master the 
learning curve and as prescribers increase their ability to customize supply), and provides 
rewards via direct incentives. 
 
Television industry : a paradigm for the internet ? 
 
The broadcast media industry offers a wealth of data for analysis of prescription. As a subset of a 
broader economic system that results from the convergence of telecommunications, information 
technology and audiovisual, it shares several characteristics with the Internet : the products 
exchanged via these media are information goods and incorporate significant value-added; the 
product supply is profuse, is conveyed to consumers via information and communications 
technology and can be consumed instantaneously online or at some future point by means of 
downloading. The importance of prescription through programming is central to the broadcast 
media industry and, thanks to wireless and high-speed Internet access, is becoming a more 
significant factor in the Internet-based economy and a focus of greater interest among access and 
service providers. 
 
The dynamics of the television industry in the last decades can be read as an evolution of the role 
of the operators and the affirmation of the function of prescription13. In the earliest and most 
traditional television format – i.e. free television – prescription operates in the form of simple 
commercial intermediation, similar to what any distributor might provide. With the introduction of 
video-on-demand, consumers need no longer rely on the programming but can choose what they 
wish to see from a database of selected programmes. More complex scenarios emerged with the 
development of cable and satellite packages. Here, prescription is no longer just a matter of 
selecting and grouping the programmes : operators choose an appropriately diversified range of 
topical channels so as to create a complete, coherent programming line-up. As a result, more 
numerous distribution channels exist, greater competition takes place among operators, 
subscription options grow and network branding emerge. Networks are enlarging their role of 
                                                 
12 For example, this is the strategy used by those mobile telephone operators and satellite television providers that offer a cell phone or satellite dish to customers 
who commit to a long-term subscription. 
13 For a more detailed analysis, see Pierre-Jean Benghozi and Thomas Paris, 2003. 
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prescribers by assuming control over a portion of their programme offerings and by actively 
structuring both the market and consumption models : consumers are then  less concerned with 
locating a given programme than with each channel’s identity, which confers a guarantee of the 
quality, the range and the type of programming as well as it makes them gaining access to 
exclusive programming matching their interests. 
 
Internet can be handled as carrying such situation to extremes while consumers cannot, 
spontaneously, grasp all information and programmes available. The most important argument is 
that consumers’ choice cannot be described as preference optimization from among existing 
contents but as sorting out from a limited array of contents. In this process, consumers entrust 
prescribers with some of their decision-making, since they do not choose a content directly from 
among all those theoretically available: they choose a prescriber that itself selects the content.  
 
 
3. Typical forms of prescription  
 
In the first part of the paper, we defined a three-pronged market structure (primary-referral-
prescription) between sellers, consumers and prescribers. The case of television industry 
suggests us that such a model could provide a conceptual framework to analyze the array of 
strategic responses. We shall now see how this wide range of possibilities can be boiled down 
to a smaller number of typical configurations - each one based on a specific business model - 
depending on how the nature of the prescription is tailored to market characteristics.. 
 
In order to make out such configurations, we shall firstly make out three different market 
structures, depending on which of the markets of our three-pronged model are effective. 
Secondly, we shall characterize different natures of prescription, according how the prescribers 
are restricting the supply and processing information on goods and services the consumers look 
at ; it will give us the means to identify specific limited types of prescribers. We shall thirdly 
use such a typology to precise the business models, strategies and dynamics associated to each 
form of prescription. 
 
3.1. Market configurations 
 
Each of the three markets we have identified may or may not be effective in our three-pronged 
model. The prescriber market is necessarily involved, but some configurations may not include 
one of the other two markets.  
 
- There may or may not be a referral market between prescribers and sellers. Depending 
on the business sector, aggregator sites (e.g. search engines or sites that provide expert 
evaluations of other sites) may demand payment from companies that wish to be listed, 
while others may simply make their selections from existing information without the need 
for a transaction. A true referral market will emerge in the first case but not in the second. 
 
- There may or may not be a primary market of goods and services. In some cases, the 
prescribers are also distributors, and the transaction will involve them alone. For example, 
some real estate is only accessible through an agency, whereas other estate can be bought 
and sold among individuals and the prescriber's only function is to bring the parties 
together. In the first case, the primary market does not exist, since the consumers are 
never in contact with the suppliers. 
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Considering these various situations, three forms of prescription14 can be identified. We can 
describe them using the terms distributor, promoter and consultant. 
 
  Referral market 
  YES NO 
YES 
 
Prescriber-promoter Prescriber-consultant 
Pr
im
a
ry
 
m
a
rk
et
 
NO Prescriber-distributor  
 
Figure 3: The three standard forms of prescription 
 
Prescriber-distributors select a 
portion of all the products and 
services available and offer them to 
the consumer. 
 
Examples: 
major retail chains, estate agents 
etc. 
 
Examples on the Internet : 
e-commerce, employment listings, 
travel sites 
 
Prescriber-consultants provide 
independent advice to consumers: 
their compensation is not based on 
the offering or on whether the 
transaction is completed. 
 
Examples : 
reviews, television programmes, 
educational organizations (school 
textbooks), travel guides 
 
 
Examples on the Internet : 
search engines, sites providing 
entertainment information, stock 
market advice 
                                                 
14 We have not considered the scenario in which there is no prescriber market, since by nature it lies outside the scope of our analysis. We have also excluded the 
commonplace scenario in which there is neither a listings market nor a primary market. 
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Prescriber-promoters limit the 
range of the offering. As a result, 
they play an ambivalent role: on 
one hand they provide help and 
advice to consumers, while on the 
other they promote a specific 
portion of the offering on behalf of 
sellers. 
 
 
Examples on the Internet : 
search engines/directories, shop 
bots 
 
 
3.2. The nature of prescription 
 
We have just defined three configurations ; each one determines how specific relationships 
among economic agents are structured. However, they do not define just how the prescriptive 
information is conveyed or the way in which it plays a role in the consumer’s decision-making 
process by restricting the consumer’s scope to a greater or lesser degree. In fact, our second 
prescription variable involves the nature of the prescriber’s recommendation – whether it is an 
injunction, a selection or an evaluation. 
 
- The prescription may be an injunction: the prescriber singles out a product that 
responds to the consumer’s requirements, as with television, a medical prescription or 
school textbooks. In this case, the decision is transferred in full from the consumer to the 
prescriber. An extreme example is the “I’m Feeling Lucky” function that Google offers 
on the Internet. 
 
- The prescription is offered as a selection: the prescriber identifies a list of approved 
products that meet the consumer’s requirements or grants certification consistent with its 
own criteria and accordingly provides a referral for a given product or company. The 
consumer still makes the final decision, but must choose from a product supply that has 
been winnowed down as part of an initial selection process conducted by the prescriber. 
Wine retailers on the Internet are one example, offering a selected range of products. 
 
- Finally, prescription may consist of an evaluation in the form of a ranking, a hierarchy 
or a list of proposed solutions accompanied by an assessment regarding essential and 
specific factors based on qualitative or quantitative criteria. In this case, consumers make 
their decision by relying on the selection factors provided by the prescriber. The Internet 
economy provides several examples: search engines that offer a list of items ranked on 
the basis of quality criteria (as specified in the query) and shop bots that rank available 
products according to price or other criteria. 
 
Note that the form of the prescription is related to the nature of the intermediation and the 
organization of the market. In an injunction, therefore, the consumer is not aware of the product 
providing, whereas in the other two cases the supply remains partially visible. 
 
 
 
Prescriber-promoters 
Offreurs
Consommateur
Prescripteurs
marché du 
référencement 
marché des 
prescripteurs
marché
primaire
Consommateurs
Sellers
bers 
Refe ral 
ma ket 
Prescriber 
market 
P imary 
rk t 
C nsumers 
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3.3. Prescription business models 
By combining the two variables we have just described (market configuration and nature of the 
prescription), we can identify various types of prescriber, each corresponding to a specific 
prescriptive method and revenue model. The following table, wherein we have provided a term 
for each type of prescriber along with an example, summarizes this typology. 
  
Table 2: Types of prescriber 
 
        NATURE OF THE 
PRESCRIPTION 
 
CONFIGURATION 
Injunction Selection Evaluation 
Prescription-distribution 
PROGRAMMER 
(Travel sites) 
DISTRIBUTOR 
(Selective e-commerce) 
Wineonline 
DISTRIBUTOR-CONSULTANT 
 
Amazon.com 
Prescription-promotion 
- WEB REFERRAL PROVIDER 
Yahoo 
SHOP BOT 
Kelkoo 
Prescription-consulting 
EXPERT CERTIFICATION SERVICE 
Google 
REVIEWER 
Entertainment sites 
 
 
The preceding analysis has demonstrated that there is no single prescription model; instead, 
prescription is used in a variety of ways, which explains the wide array of examples that can be 
found on the Internet. When an economic actor positions itself in the prescription market, it 
defines the variables that will govern its activity and the way it operates. Some of these 
variables are mutually exclusive. For example, web referral providers cannot also serve as 
consultants or experts, since consumers will have no confidence in the independence of a third 
party that is compensated for promoting a product. In the following table, we show how several 
factors are related: 1) prescriber’s positioning within its business sector, 2) competition 
structure and competitive leverage and 3) sources of revenue (distribution and profit-sharing 
margins, charging of prescription services and referrals, audience value through the sale of 
marketing space and the marketing of customer data). 
 
We are now able to build on these different categories, developing their economic 
consequences and the strategic dynamics they encourage. Some of these categories sound 
different but will be presented altogether. This is the case for distributor and distributor-
consultant, for referral and shop bots, for certification services and reviewer, as peculiarities 
concerning selection and evaluation activities have, at first sight, no noteworthy impact on their 
business model. Differences between these categories come into view when considering more 
precisely the production process and value added of prescribers15.  
 
                                                 
15 We shall not develop this point taking into view the limited space of our contribution. 
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Table 3: Prescription business models 
 
Prescriber type 
Forms of competitive leverage Business models  / Revenue source 
PROGRAMMER Supply structure Distribution margins Sale of advertising space 
DISTRIBUTOR Price Distribution margins Sale of referrals 
DISTRIBUTOR-
CONSULTANT 
Supply structure 
Price 
Distribution margins 
Sale of referrals (end-of-year refunds) 
REFERRAL PROVIDER 
Supply structure 
Capture of consumers 
Sale of referrals 
Sale of advertising space 
SHOP BOT Supply structure Sale of referrals Profit-sharing 
EXPERT Supply structure Capture of consumers 
Sale of information and evaluations 
Sale of advertising space 
CERTIFICATION SERVICE Capture of consumers Sale of information and evaluations Sale of advertising space 
REVIEWER Supply structure Capture of consumers 
Sale of information and evaluations 
Sale of advertising space 
 
3.3.1. Programmer 
The programmer responds to consumer demand by providing a product. This is the type of 
prescription found in traditional broadcasting media. It can also be found in certain travel sites: 
consumers specify their travel requirements and the site then offers a proposed itinerary for 
purchase. 
 
Programmers survive primarily on their profits from distribution and offer the prescription 
service free of charge. Their value-added lies in both the quantity of goods, informations and 
services they can provide (i.e. their ability to respond to every request) and the quality of the 
products they sell. In addition, their ability to generate a large audience may enable them to sell 
advertising space. 
 
 
3.3.2. Distributors / distributor-consultants 
Distributors and distributor-consultants select several products and provide them to consumers, 
who make their own selection. Distributors earn their revenue primarily from the profits they 
make; distributor-consultants may be able to charge for their prescription services if they can 
link them to the retail process. Insofar as they make a selection, distributors and distributor-
consultants can charge for referrals.  
 
 
3.3.3. Referral providers / shop bots 
Referral providers and shop bots participate in a transaction purely at an informational level. 
They do not distribute products, but instead help consumers to evaluate them on the basis of 
either cardinal and quantitative assessment (web referral) or hierarchical structure (price 
comparison). Their value-added stems from the quality of their evaluations, which have the 
potential to build a significant audience that advertisers will find attractive; they also generate 
income by selling referral opportunities to sellers. 
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3.3.4. Experts 
Experts have no economic ties to sellers. They are paid by consumers to make a selection on 
the consumer’s behalf. Not-for-profit community-based websites are one of the few examples 
of this type of prescription on the Internet. 
 
 
3.3.5. Certification services and reviewers 
Certification services and reviewers have no financial relationship with sellers; they merely 
express an opinion. Their value-added is based on the quality and relevance of their views, their 
business model and their ability to generate and draw value from an audience. 
 
 
3.3.6. Summary 
Prescribers must address the strategic decision of where to position themselves among the 
options in Table 3 and what their source of revenue will be. Not every choice is open to them, 
however, since certain products or services may entail a specific positioning in the market. We 
showed, in Benghozi (2001), how information and communication technologies can shape 
internal organizations and industrial sectors creating new  links between physical trades and 
information-based relations, and converting key-assets (location, information, technology) into 
business economic models on the internet. 
 
Some market configurations lend themselves to an injunction, while others do not. For 
example, a third party may define a travel itinerary and select airplane company for a consumer 
in accordance with specific requirements (location, dates, price level)16. By contrast, consumers 
make the final decision when purchasing a novel: in such a case, the prescription cannot serve 
as an injunction. For some goods, such as real estate or travel services, prescription and 
distribution are necessarily linked because of the existing market, but this is not always the 
case. On the other hand, the ability to combine prescription with another service, such as 
distribution, is essential for service providers who wish to charge customers for the prescription 
they are offering; otherwise, consumers can use the prescription and proceed to make their 
purchase from a retailer that does not impose a surcharge for the prescription. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The expansion of the Internet-based economy has prompted a realignment of value chains by 
severing the link between information functions and logistical functions. In this study, we have 
shown how the growing influence of distribution and intermediation functions reflects, in 
broader terms, the emergence of new business models that can be said to have their origins in a 
specific prescription economy. We have defined these models by identifying the structure of the 
prescription markets, the nature of the prescriptions and the competitive strategies adopted by 
these prescribers. 
 
In addition to this prescription typology, we should emphasize a number of significant results. 
 
Despite available information on the internet, customers have imperfect information, may face 
risks and have to be advised and conforted. As information assumes a greater role in market 
organization, infomediaries are emerging and information markets are being created alongside 
existing markets for goods. More important, however, is the fact that the structure of 
                                                 
16 Low costs companies are a noteworthy exception : they by pass prescribers such as travel agencies, selling their seat directly on the internet and imposing their 
own company. 
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transactions is being profoundly altered, as reflected in the transfer to prescribers of both 
expertise and – to a partial extent – decision-making power. A worth mentioning consequence 
can be characterized as the “podium effect”: prescribers contribute to concentrate demand on  
an ever more limited range of informations, goods or services. Such effect is already well 
known in cultural industries, it takes place progressively more  in the internet17. 
 
The emergence of prescription services demonstrates how markets are becoming increasingly 
complex, coalescing around three-part structures that are opening up new strategic options. 
These structures are more than just intermediary market platforms. 
 
An analysis of decision-making procedures and strategic challenges reveals that, in order to 
understand why prescription has emerged, we must consider the distinction that consumers 
draw between choosing a prescriber and choosing a product or service on the primary market. 
To do this, we must incorporate the timing of decision-making into our analysis. Time factor 
affects not only the individual decision-making process but also the nature of the competition 
that we find among prescribers18. 
 
Prescription markets promote a form of competition that focuses simultaneously on 
information, price and consumer control. This explains why the Internet has in fact prompted an 
increase in the number of business models, operating side by side to sell the same goods and 
services, rather than leading to simpler competitive structures based on price. 
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Table 1: Some configuration of prescription markets 
 
Key:   Direction of cash flow     Purchaser    Seller 
            Direction of a information flow  
 
Health care      School textbooks 
 
S      S 
 
    Advertising              Advertising  
 
Purchase of   P   Book purchase     P 
medications 
     Consultation 
 
D      D 
 
Multibrand distribution - Pay TV 
S       Free TV 
 
    Product purchase       S 
      End-of-year refunds 
 Advertising            Programme purchase 
   P 
             P 
      Product purchase      
 
D                 Advertising purchase 
 
Experts - critical review       D      Product purchase   D’ 
 
S        Advertising market 
 
 
 
 Purchase of goods 
 or services   P 
 
      Purchase of advice 
      or books 
 
 
 
 
Recommendation 
Collection of information 
Secondary market 
Advertiser + Producer 
of industrial goods  
